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Abstract We develop a framework for studying the interactions between organized
crime and corruption, together with the individual and combined effects of these
phenomena on economic growth. Criminal organizations co-exist with law-abiding
productive agents and potentially corrupt law enforcers. The crime syndicate obstructs
the economic activities of agents through extortion, and may pay bribes to law enforcers
in return for their compliance in this. We show how organized crime has a negative
effect on growth, and how this effect may be either enhanced or mitigated in the
presence of corruption. The outcome depends critically on a trade-off generated when
corruption exists, that between a lower supply of crimes and the probability these
crimes are more likely to be successful.
Keywords Corruption · Economic growth · Organized crime
JEL Classification D73 · K49 · O43
1 Introduction
There is a strong presumption that organized crime typically involves implicit collusion
with, or direct participation of, the public sector. In 1994, the United Nation’s Naples
Declaration officially recognized that organized crime has a “corrupting influence on
fundamental social, economic and political institutions”, and that the common practice
of organized criminal networks is to use “violence, intimidation and corruption to earn
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profit or control territories or markets”.1 More recently, a survey of public perceptions
conducted by the Eurobarometer (2006) revealed that more than half of European
citizens believe that most of the corruption in their countries is caused by organized
crime.
It is not difficult to understand why criminal syndicates would want to lure public
officials-law enforcers, in particular—into corruption. Doing so offers the prospect
of greater opportunities to engage in illicit activities with less risk of detection and
prosecution. Such activities (including drugs trafficking, money laundering and extor-
tion) are likely to be more successful with the compliance of law enforcement officers
who are willing to accept bribes in return for various favours (e.g., turning a blind eye
against offences, providing information about police inquiries and falsifying reports
about arrests). More generally, organized crime can foster corruption at all levels of
public office by targeting different areas—the police, the judiciary and the political
administration.2 The general conclusion of most observers and practitioners is that
organized crime flourishes most when the functioning of society’s public institutions
is undermined by corruption. Evidence of this can be found in several empirical stud-
ies covering various countries in different regions of the world and at different stages
of socio-economic development: examples include Mazzitelli (2007) for West Africa,
Sergi and Qerimi (2007) for South-East Europe, and Buscaglia and Van Dijk (2003)
for a more global sample of territories.
Theoretical work on the issue has focused largely on the role of corruption in influ-
encing and compromising strategies to combat organized crime. Becker and Stigler
(1974) were the first to point out that the payment of bribes by criminals to law
enforcers can weaken the threat of prosecution for criminal activity, suggesting that
deterring such activity could be strengthened by remunerating public enforcers suf-
ficiently well and/or paying private enforcers according to performance. These ideas
were taken up in subsequent work which raised qualifications and questions about
the proposals (e.g., Besley and MacLaren 1993; Mookherjee and Png 1992). In a
similar vein, Bowles and Garoupa (1997) showed why the standard prescription of
imposing the maximum fine on criminals may not be optimal when there is complic-
ity between the criminal and arresting officer at the expense of the police department.
Chang et al. (2000) introduce subjective psychic costs of corruption (moral shame and
social stigma), demonstrating how social norms may create conditions under which
an increase in fines for criminal activity are counter-productive. Along related lines,
Kugler et al. (2003) identify circumstances where strategic complementarities between
corruption and organized crime mean that tougher sanctions on crime produce higher
rates of crime. From different perspectives, Garoupa and Klerman (2004) show that
it is optimal to use non-monetary penalties against crime (e.g., imprisonment) more
frequently in the presence, than in absence, of corruption, whilst Polinsky and Shavell
1 UN GA Resolution 49/159 Naples Political Declaration and Global Action against Organized Transna-
tional Crime (23/121994); UN GA Resolution 1996/27 Implementation of the Naples Political Declaration
and Global Action Plan against Organized Transnational Crime (24/07/1996).
2 This is evidenced in a report by the Center for the Study of Democracy (2010) which focuses on the
links between organized crime and corruption in 27 European Member States using a statistical analysis of
various indicators and interviews.
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(2001) suggest that sanctions against corruption, rather than sanctions against crime,
are optimal in mitigating criminal behavior.
Whilst the foregoing research has delivered important results and yielded valuable
insights, there is still considerable room for further investigation into the link between
corruption and organized crime. A particularly fertile area for investigation is the extent
to which this link may have an influence on overall economic performance. This is
the theme of the present paper, which takes a step beyond the microeconomic (partial
equilibrium) analysis of individual decision making (as exemplified above) towards
the relatively unexplored macroeconomic (general equilibrium) analysis of aggregate
outcomes (growth and development). The paper develops a series of analytical models
in pursuing this new avenue of research.
We develop a framework for studying the interactions between organized crime
and corruption, together with the individual and combined effects of these phenomena
on economic growth. This framework describes an environment in which a criminal
organization co-exists with law-abiding productive agents and potentially corrupt law
enforcers. The crime syndicate obstructs the economic activities of agents through
extortion, and may pay bribes to law enforcers in return for their compliance in this.
We first show how the presence of organized crime on its own reduces economic
performance by deterring agents from engaging in growth-promoting ventures (capital
production). We then show how this effect may be either exacerbated or mitigated by
the coexistence of both organized crime and corruption. Simply put, our analysis
suggests that growth may be either higher or lower in a crime-only environment than
in a crime-plus-corruption environment.
To be more specific, we develop an overlapping generations endogenous growth
model where some agents are entrepreneurs that make investment decisions.
Entrepreneurs are heterogeneous in their cost of entrepreneurial effort, and as a result,
the measure of them who decide to invest depends on their perceived effective rate
of return. It is this effort that directly maps into economic activity and determines
the economic growth rate. Organized crime takes the form of a tax (extortion) on
the expected returns of to-be entrepreneurs, and, thus, lowers the equilibrium growth
rate compared to the economy without crime. Corruption takes the form of a tax
(bribes to law enforcers) on the expected returns of criminals, which, in turn, hurts
the entrepreneurs’ expected investment returns and economic growth. The presence
of corruption has two effects. It reduces the supply of crimes, but makes crimes that
happen more likely to be successful. This gives rise to an ambiguity of the comparative
static over the equilibrium growth rate with crime as compared to the growth rate with
both crime and corruption. This finding highlights the importance of treating jointly
the two illegal phenomena of organized crime and corruption in the context of growth
analysis.
The remainder of the paper is divided into four parts. Section 2 presents an economy
without any illicit activities. Section 3 introduces organized crime, whilst Sect. 4
further introduces corruption. Section 5 compares the macroeconomic outcomes of
the two environments: an economy with organized crime only versus an economy
riddled with both types of illegalities. Some concluding remarks are given in Sect. 6.
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2 An economy without illegalities
The general framework that we use for our theoretical analysis describes a dynamic,
endogenously growing economy which is populated by heterogeneous agents engaged
in different occupations. The engine of growth is capital accumulation, and the set of
occupations may include both legal (productive) and illegal (non-productive) activ-
ities. The former consist of the production of output and capital, together with the
enforcement of governance. The latter consist of illicit profiteering by private indi-
viduals and public officials. We begin by describing the benchmark scenario in which
the economy is free from any malevolent behavior. Subsequently, we introduce such
behavior and explore the implications thereof.
We consider an overlapping generations economy in which there is a constant
population of two-period-lived agents. Each generation of agents is divided at birth
into two groups of citizens—a unit mass of households (or workers) and a unit mass of
firms (or entrepreneurs). The former are suppliers of labor when young and consumers
of output when old. The latter are (potential) producers of capital when young, and
producers and consumers of output when old. All agents are risk neutral and all markets
are competitive. We proceed with our formal description of the environment with
reference to the behavior of agents of generation t .
2.1 Workers
Each young worker supplies one unit of labor inelastically to old entrepreneurs (pro-
ducers of output) in return for a wage of wt . A worker can save this income in two
ways. The first is by accessing some storage technology which pays a fixed rate of
return of ρ. The second is by making loans to young entrepreneurs (producers of cap-
ital), the rate of interest on which is also ρ by virtue of competition between lenders.
The proceeds of savings are used to finance retirement consumption.
2.2 Entrepreneurs
The ultimate activity of entrepreneurs is the manufacture of final output in the sec-
ond period of their lives. The inputs to manufacturing are labor (hired from young
households of the next generation) and capital (acquired from investment projects
undertaken previously by firms of the current generation).3 A mature entrepreneur
employing nt+1 units of labor and kt+1 units of capital is able to produce yt+1 units
of output according to
yt+1 = nαt+1k1−αt+1 K αt+1, (1)
3 We abstract from the use of human capital as an input, although one could visualise a scenario where
organized crime and corruption can discourage the accumulation of knowledge. Blackburn and Chivers
(2015) consider a model where agents are not prevented from investing in human capital but it is not in
their interests to do so because the loss associated with a risky venture is too great to make the venture
attractive, even if it offers the prospect of high rewards. A similar principle can apply when agents decide
on their level of human capital investment when operating within a risky environment, riddled with illegal
activities.
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(α ∈ (0, 1)) where Kt+1 denotes the aggregate stock of capital.4 Labor is hired at
the competitively determined wage rate wt+1, whilst capital is rented at the com-
petitively determined interest rate it+1. If an entrepreneur produced κt+1 units of
capital when young, then he is a net borrower of capital if kt+1 − κt+1 > 0
and a net lender of capital if kt+1 − κt+1 < 0. His profit is therefore πt+1 =
nαt+1k
1−α
t+1 K αt+1 − wt+1nt+1 − it+1(kt+1 − κt+1) which, for given values of wt+1,
it+1, Kt+1 and κt+1, is maximised by choosing nt+1 and kt+1 so as to satisfy
αnα−1t+1 k
1−α
t+1 K αt+1 = wt+1 and (1 − α)nαt+1k−αt+1 K αt+1 = it+1. Since nt+1 = 1 and
Kt+1 = kt+1 in equilibrium, we may state these conditions as
wt+1 = αkt+1, (2)
it+1 = 1 − α. (3)
In turn, entrepreneurial profits can be written as
πt+1 = (1 − α)κt+1. (4)
In the first period of life an entrepreneur chooses whether or not to undertake an
investment project from which capital is produced. Depending on this choice, either
κt+1 > 0 or κt+1 = 0. Capital is produced using loans, lt , acquired from young
workers (i.e., workers of the same generation). The capital production technology is
given by
κt+1 = Alt , (5)
where (A > 0).5 In addition to loans, an investment project requires a certain amount
of entrepreneurial effort, et , which we assume to be proportional to the scale of the
project, as measured by the size of loan: that is, et = εlt (ε > 0). Entrepreneurs are
heterogeneous in terms of this effort, which is higher for some than for others. This
may be thought of as reflecting idiosyncratic endowments of technical capabilities
(skills, knowledge, expertise and the like) which determine entrepreneurs’ efficiency
in capital production. We capture this through differences in ε which, for simplicity,
is specified to be uniformly distributed on the unit interval with probability density
function f (ε) = 1. Accordingly, ∫ ε
ε
f (ε)dε = ε− ε gives a measure of entrepreneurs
for whom ε ∈ (ε, ε).
An entrepreneur’s final income, mt+1, may be deduced as follows. Recall that
the interest rate on loans used for capital production is ρ. Accordingly, either mt+1 =
πt+1−(1+ρ)lt if an entrepreneur engaged in such production (κt+1 > 0), or mt+1 = 0
if an entrepreneur abstained from this (κt+1 = 0). Equivalently, using (4) and (5), we
have
4 This aggregate externality—a common feature of endogenous growth models—allows us to work with a
simple AK technology, where the social returns to capital are constant. Our main results would not change
were we to assume diminishing returns to capital, instead.
5 In this framework, entrepreneurs have perfect access to the loans market. For a general equilibrium
model with occupational choice, heterogeneous agents, imperfect enforcement and costly intermediation,
see Antunes et al. (2015).
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mt+1 =
{
Mlt if κt+1 > 0,
0 if κt+1 = 0. (6)
where M = (1 − α)A − (1 + ρ).
An entrepreneur’s final utility, ut , may also be derived straightforwardly. Assuming
linear disutility from effort in the production of capital, either ut = mt+1−et or ut = 0
depending on whether or not capital production is undertaken. Given (6), and recalling
that et = εlt , it follows that
ut =
{
(M − ε)lt if κt+1 > 0,
0 if κt+1 = 0. (7)
As indicated above, the key decision for an entrepreneur is whether or not to engage
in capital production when young. The condition for doing so is realised from (7) as
M − ε ≥ 0, or
ε ≤ M ≡ ε. (8)
This expression defines a critical level of required effort, ε, such that capital production
is undertaken (abstained from) by an entrepreneur for whom ε ≤ ε (ε > ε).
2.3 Growth
The dynamic general equilibrium of the economy is summarized by a capital accu-
mulation path which describes a process of long-run, endogenous growth. This path
is determined as follows.
The quantity ε in (8) gives the fraction of young entrepreneurs who engage in capital
production, the total amount of which is therefore εκt+1. This must be equal to kt+1,
the total amount of capital that is used by all old entrepreneurs in the production of
output. Thus, from (5), kt+1 = εAlt . Since the total amount of loans, lt , is equal to
the total wage incomes of workers, wt , it follows from (2) that lt = αkt . Combining
these observations, we derive the equilibrium growth rate of the economy as
kt+1
kt
= εAα ≡ g. (9)
The key factor in determining growth is the population of capital producers. Any
aspect of the environment that influences ε will also influence g. In the present cir-
cumstances of perfect markets and perfect governance, it is simply the fundamentals
of technology that matter. As shown in (8), ε is determined by M which depends only
on the return from, and cost of, undertaking capital production. The higher is A or the
lower is ρ the higher is both ε and g as the greater is the number of entrepreneurs who
choose to be producers of capital.
123
A theory of organized crime, corruption and economic growth 233
3 An economy with organized crime
We introduce crime into the model by considering the case in which entrepreneurs are
exposed to extortion by an illicit organization—a crime syndicate or cartel—which we
refer to as the mafia for shorthand.6 Like all other agents, the mafia behaves optimally
by choosing its racketeering activities so as to maximise its (expected) payoff. Since
workers are unaffected by such activities, their behavior remains the same as before
and we do not repeat our description of this.7
3.1 Law enforcers
Implicit in the model is a system of law enforcement designed to obstruct and prevent,
detect and prosecute, criminal behavior. For convenience, we refer to enforcers of the
law as those immediately responsible for crime prevention—that is, the police, which
has a measure of unit mass.8 In the context of the present environment, it is assumed
that the police executes its duties in full accordance with the above objectives for
mitigating crime. In return for this, each police official is paid a salary of st , which
is financed by lump-sum taxes on workers and which is saved in the same manner as
workers.
3.2 Entrepreneurs
Only those entrepreneurs who choose to produce capital are subject to extortion, since
only these agents earn a positive income in accordance with (6). We assume that
each of them faces a probability, p ∈ (0, 1), of being preyed upon (1 − p being
the probability of avoiding this). One may think of this probability as reflecting the
coverage and quality of policing when law-enforcement is functioning at its most
effective level (i.e., when there is no failure in governance, other than the practical and
technical difficulties in detecting and prosecuting offenders). The more effective is
law-enforcement, the lower is p and the greater is an entrepreneur’s protection against
predation.
From each capital producer, the mafia extorts a payment of xct+1, which we assume
to be a fraction of a capital producer’s income, xct+1 = χcmt+1 (χc ∈ (0, 1)). Any
entrepreneur who refuses to concede this payment is threatened with some personal
damage, dct+1, which we also assume to be proportional to entrepreneurial income,
dct+1 = δcmt+1 (δc > 0). This punishment may vary in severity. What matters is the
6 For the purposes of our analysis, we treat the existence of criminal activity as given. The incentives for
individuals to engage in such activity is elucidated in the pioneering work of Becker (1968). Our focus is
different, being centered on the effects (rather than causes) of crime when this is perpetrated by a well-
established, organized criminal network.
7 The only change to the circumstances of workers is a lump-sum tax, which is used to pay the salary of law
enforcement officials. This is only relevant to computing the dynamic general equilibrium, as we elucidate
at the appropriate time.
8 This is largely for expositional purposes. Our analysis may be extended, or interpreted more broadly, to
cover the functioning of higher levels of law enforcement (i.e., the judiciary).
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threat that it exists, which is the means by which the mafia seeks to enforce its illicit
profiteering.
Given the above, we may deduce the expected utility of an entrepreneur, E(ut ),
in the presence of organized crime. The entrepreneur earns an income of mt+1, as
given in (6). For a non-producer of capital (κt+1 = 0), this is also his final expected
utility: that is, E(ut ) = 0. For a producer of capital (κt+1 > 0), utility is determined as
follows. With probability p, the entrepreneur is confronted by the mafia, in which case
he forfeits xct+1 amount of income if he succumbs to extortion, or incurs a disutility of
dct+1 if he resists being extorted. With probability 1 − p, the entrepreneur avoids the
mafia, in which case he suffers neither of these losses. Accordingly, either E(ut ) =
p(mt+1 − xct+1 − et ) + (1 − p)(mt+1 − et ) = mt+1 − pxct+1 − et or E(ut ) =
p(mt+1 −dct+1 − et )+ (1− p)(mt+1 − et ) = mt+1 − pdct+1 − et , where et is recalled
to be the amount of required effort to engage in capital production. Naturally, an
entrepreneur is willing to comply with the mafia’s demands if xct+1 ≤ dct+1 - that is, if
the cost of paying the mafia is no greater than the cost of not doing so. From above,
we may write this condition as χc ≤ δc. Assuming that this is satisfied (which we
verify subsequently), the expected utility of an entrepreneur may be computed as
E(ut ) =
{ [(1 − pχc)M − ε]lt if κt+1 > 0,
0 if κt+1 = 0 (10)
Like before, an entrepreneur will choose to engage in capital production if his
expected utility from doing so is no less than his expected utility from not doing so.
From (10), this condition is given formally as (1 − pχc)M − ε ≥ 0, or
ε ≤ (1 − pχc)M ≡ εc. (11)
As in (8), this expression defines a critical level of required effort, εc, below (above)
which an entrepreneur will choose to engage in (abstain from) capital production.
Evidently, εc < ε for any p, χc ∈ (0, 1), which shows that crime has the effect
of deterring capital production by some entrepreneurs who would have otherwise
engaged in this venture. This follows from the fact that the expected payoff from such
a venture is reduced when crime exists due to the potential extra cost associated with
extortion.9
3.3 Organized criminals
The mafia seeks to extort money from capital producers by intimidating them with the
threat of violence should they refuse to comply. This way of modelling organized crime
is common in the academic literature (e.g., Alexeev et al. 2004; Kugler et al. 2003;
Shelling 1984), and accords closely with the generally accepted definition of such
9 This is consistent with the empirical observation that entrepreneurs perceive racketeering as an extra risky
expense in doing business (e.g., Daniele and Marani 2010; Kroska and Robeck 2006; Peri 2004).
123
A theory of organized crime, corruption and economic growth 235
activitity amongst criminologists.10 As indicated earlier, we treat the crime syndicate
as a rational decision maker whose objective is to maximise its expected payoff from
extortion.
We assume that the mafia faces a probability, q ∈ (0, 1), of succeeding in its
racketeering by evading arrest and prosecution (1 − q being the probability of failing
in this). Again, one may think of this probability as depending on the quality and
effectiveness of the legal system: the better functioning is this system, the lower is q
and the lower is the mafia’s prospect of escaping the clutches of the law. We suppose
that, in the event of being caught, the mafia incurs a punishment, which includes
the seizure of at least some of its illicit earnings. In accordance with other analyses
(as well as observed practice), we consider the severity of the punishment as being
commensurate with the gravity of the offence (the level of extortion in our case). We
capture this by specifying γ xct+1 (γ ∈ (0, 1)) as the amount of extortion payment that
the mafia stands to lose should it suffer legal retribution.11
Another cost to the mafia relates to the means by which it seeks to enforce its illicit
profiteering. As alluded to already, this involves the use of threats of violence against
non-compliant individuals who face a penalty of dct+1 if they do not succumb to the
mafia’s demands. Such threats must be credible, and we assume that it is costly for the
mafia to ensure this. Specifically, we suppose that the cost of threats is given by 
dct+1
(
 > 0), being proportional to the amount of damage inflicted on victims. This cost
is incurred ex ante and is independent of the number of potential victims: the mafia
must arm itself before knowing which individuals are susceptible to extortion, after
which the same threat can be applied to all individuals.12
With the foregoing in mind, we may compute the mafia’s expected payoff, E(vt ), as
follows. Its illegal income from each of its prey is xct+1. With probability q, all of this
income is retained. With probability 1−q, only (1−γ )xct+1 of this income is retained.
The mafia’s expected earnings from each of its victims is therefore qxct+1+(1−q)(1−
γ )xct+1 = [1 − γ (1 − q)]xct+1. The number of potential victims is given by εc in (11),
and the probability that any one of them is susceptible to extortion is given by p. The
product of these terms represents the mafia’s extortion base. Accordingly, the mafia’s
total expected earnings from racketeering is deduced to be [1 − γ (1 − q)]xct+1 pεc.
Deducted from this is the cost of enforcing extortion, 
dct+1. Recalling that xct+1 =
χcmt+1 and dct+1 = δcmt+1, where mt+1 is given in (6), we arrive at the following
final expression for the mafia’s expected payoff:
E(vt ) = {[1 − γ (1 − q)]χc pεc − 
δc}Mlt . (12)
10 That is, organized crime is the perpetration of illegal activities for material benefit by coordinated groups
of individuals who ply their trade through extortion, corruption and subversion using extreme violence (e.g.,
Kenney and Finckenauer 1995; Levi 2002).
11 This is a pecuniary punishment, but there are obviously non-pecuniary punishments as well (e.g., impris-
onment). The former may be considered as encompassing the latter in the sense that it represents the illegal
income that could have been earned if a criminal was not incarcerated. In any case, the separate inclusion
of a non-pecuniary punishment is a trivial extension to the model that would not alter the main results.
12 The mafia needs only to demonstrate that it has the capabilities of inflicting harm. At the extreme, its
possession of just one explosive device, one firearm or one ruthless thug poses the same threat to all potential
victims.
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In choosing its optimal behavior, the mafia takes into account the influence of
its actions on the optimal behavior of its prey. Specifically, the mafia realises that a
greater level of extortion, χc, has two effects: the first is to reduce the number of
potential victims, εc in (11), by inducing more entrepreneurs to abstain from capital
production; the second is to undermine the condition for capital producers’ compliance
in extortion, χc ≤ δc, which may necessitate the use of more severe and more costly
means of enforcing compliance. With these considerations in mind, the mafia chooses
its level of extortion and scale of retribution so as to maximise its expected utility.
Formally, its problem is given as
max
χc,δc
. E(vt ) = {[1 − γ (1 − q)]χc pεc − 
δc}Mlt ,
s.t. εc = (1 − pχc)M,
χc ≤ δc.
The solution to this problem is derived in the Appendix as
χc = δc = 1
2p
{
1 − 

p[1 − γ (1 − q)]M
}
, (13)
εc = 1
2
{
M + 

p[1 − γ (1 − q)]
}
. (14)
These expressions have the following intuitive properties.
The fact that χc = δc in (13) reflects the mafia’s minimisation of costs in imple-
menting its racketeering: the least costly way of exacting illicit payments from capital
producers is to threaten them with an equivalent (no greater) punishment should they
refuse to comply. The optimal amount of extortion, itself, is observed to be decreas-
ing in 
, decreasing in γ (1 − q) and either decreasing or increasing in p. The first
property shows that the level of extortion is higher, the lower is the exogenous cost
to the mafia of enforcing it. The second property similarly reveals that the amount
of extortion is increased when the mafia faces a lower expected punishment for its
offence.13 The third property is a little more subtle, demonstrating that greater racke-
teering opportunities for the mafia may lead to either higher or lower levels of extortion.
This follows from the fact that the extortion base, pεc, may move either way as the
scope for predation increases: on the one hand, a higher fraction of capital producers
are able to be exploited, which tends to raise the extortion base and to exacerbate
the mafia’s demands; on the other hand, fewer entrepreneurs are inclined to undertake
capital production, which tends to lower the extortion base and to moderate the mafia’s
demands.
The above results are reflected in capital production activity, as given in (14). The
number of capital producers, εc, is seen to be increasing in 
, increasing in γ (1 − q)
and decreasing in p. The first and second of these properties are allied directly to
the higher levels of extortion that the mafia chooses when faced with lower costs of
13 Put the other way, criminal activity is lower when the expected penalty for this activity is higher—an
implication that accords with the spirit of Becker (1968).
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pursuing such activity (i.e., lower costs of enforcement and/or lower expected costs
of prosecution). Under such circumstances, capital production is less profitable and
therefore less attractive to a greater number of entrepreneurs. The third property reveals
that an increase in exposure to mafia predation, whilst having an ambiguous effect on
the amount of extortion, causes a net decrease in the population of capital producers:
even if the mafia extorts less, fewer entrepreneurs choose to participate in capital
production because of their greater prospect of being preyed upon and their greater
expected loss of income, pχc.
3.4 Growth
The equilibrium growth rate of the economy is derived as before by combining the cap-
ital market clearing condition, kt+1 = εc Alt , with the loan market clearing condition,
lt = wt , and recalling the expression for wt in (2).14 Doing this gives
kt+1
kt
= εc Aα ≡ gc. (15)
Evidently, growth is now influenced by factors other than technology since the
number of capital producers is influenced likewise. In particular, gc is reduced by any
reduction in εc caused by an increase in the extent of criminal activity, as alluded to
above. Comparing (15) with (9), making use of our earlier observation that εc < ε,
we arrive at the conclusion that gc < g: growth in a crime-ridden economy is lower
than growth in a crime-free economy.15
4 An economy with organized crime and corruption
Our modelling of corruption centers on the behavior of law enforcers and their rela-
tionship with the crime cartel. In our previous analysis we assumed that the police
acted with full integrity in executing its crime prevention duties. This meant that capi-
tal producers had at least some chance of being protected against mafia predation. We
now consider the case in which police officers are corruptible in the sense of being
potentially willing to accept bribes from the mafia in return for turning a blind eye
to the mafia’s activities.16 Like before, the behavior of workers is unaffected, and we
focus only on the new dimensions of the model.
14 Note that neither the mafia’s illegal income, nor law enforcers’ legal income, contribute to the amount of
loanable funds. The reason for the former is that each generation of mafiosi extracts its income in the second
period of life. The reason for the latter is that law enforcers’ salaries are merely lump-sum tax transfers
from workers, which net out of aggregate savings.
15 As indicated previously, (8) and (11) imply that εc < ε must be true, given that both p ∈ (0, 1) (which
we obviously assume) and χc ∈ (0, 1) (which we need to ensure). From (12), the parameter restriction
needed for the latter is [1−γ (1−q)]Mp > 
 > [1−γ (1−q)]Mp(1−2p). The first inequality (χc > 0)
is sufficient for delivering εc < ε.
16 For simplicity, we shall assume that all police officers are susceptible to bribery. Our main results would
not change were we to consider some fraction of them as being non-corruptible.
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4.1 Law enforcers
As mentioned previously, police officers earn a salary of st when young, which is saved
at the rate of interest ρ to finance their consumption when old. A police officer who
is corrupt seeks to supplement his old-age consumption by accepting bribe payments
from the mafia, which is then free to commit its offences. We assume that the amount
of bribe demanded for each offence, bt+1, is proportional to the mafia’s income from
that offence: that is, bt+1 = (1 − β)xcct+1 (β ∈ (0, 1)).17 Using higher case notation
to denote aggregate variables, the total bribe income of each corrupt law enforcer is
then given by Bt+1 = (1 − β)Xcct+1.18
Bribe-taking is risky because of the possibility of being caught and prosecuted.
We assume that this event is avoided with probability r ∈ (0, 1). Otherwise (with
probability 1 − r ), corruption is exposed and each perpetrator of it is subject to a
punishment of ft+1 which may be pecuniary (e.g., a fine) and/or non-pecuniary (e.g.,
imprisonment). We suppose that this punishment is set by the judiciary in a way
that is commensurate with the scale of the mafia’s racketeering: specifically, we set
ft+1 = φXcct+1 (φ > 0).19 The probability that corruption goes undetected reflects the
government’s imperfect monitoring of such activity and may be regarded as another
measure of the quality of governance in model: the better is this quality, the lower is
r and the greater is the likelihood that corrupt behavior is detected.
Depending on whether bribes are refused or accepted, a law-enforcer expects a
payoff of either (1 + ρ)st , or r [(1 + ρ)st + Bt+1] + (1 − r)[(1 + ρ)st + Bt+1 −
ft+1] = (1 + ρ)st + Bt+1 − (1 − r) ft+1. It follows that bribes will be accepted if
(1 + ρ)st + Bt+1 − (1 − r) ft+1 ≥ (1 + ρ)st , or Bt+1 ≥ (1 − r) ft+1. Under our
previous assumptions, this condition may be re-stated as 1−β ≥ (1−r)φ. Intuitively,
a police officer is willing to accept a bribe payment that is at least equal to the expected
punishment for his crime.
4.2 Entrepreneurs
The existence of corruption affects entrepreneurs both directly and indirectly. The
direct effect is a loss of protection against mafia predation due to the police’s complicity
in this activity. This is captured by setting p = 1. The indirect effect is a change in
the level of extortion due to the mafia’s need to pay bribes for this complicity. This is
reflected in the optimal choice of xcct+1 = χccmt+1, to which we attend later.
17 We distinguish xcct+1 from xct+1 since, as we shall see, the level of extortion when corruption exists is
different from the level of extortion when corruption is absent.
18 We do not differentiate between law enforcers. Each one of them earns the same bribe income, whether
due to the same number of capital producers under each one’s protection, or the sharing of illicit earnings
amongst all of them.
19 This assumption reflects the idea that the judiciary may be able to observe the amount of extortion, but
not the amount of bribe payments. For example, whilst capital producers may be quite willing to report how
much the mafia has extorted from them, corrupt law enforcers would want to conceal their bribe income.
The most that the judiciary knows is that bribes are proportional to the amount of extortion, and therefore
sets its punishment in the same way.
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Like before, an entrepreneur who abstains from capital production earns a utility
of ut = 0. Unlike before, an entrepreneur who engages in capital production earns
a utility of either ut = mt+1 − xcct+1 − et or ut = mt+1 − dcct+1 − et , depending on
whether or not he surrenders to extortion, where dcct+1 = δccmt+1.20 The condition for
surrendering is unchanged—that is, xcct+1 ≤ dcct+1, or χcc ≤ δcc. Assuming that this is
satisfied, an entrepreneur’s payoff under alternative choices is
ut =
{ [(1 − χcc)M − ε]lt if κt+1 > 0,
0 if κt+1 = 0. (16)
Following our previous analysis, we may deduce from (16) that (1−χcc)M −ε ≥ 0
is the condition for an entrepreneur to undertake capital production, which we may
write as
ε ≤ (1 − χcc)M ≡ εcc. (17)
As before, this expression defines a critical level of required effort, εcc, below (above)
which an entrepreneur will choose to undertake (forego) capital production. Also like
before, a comparison with (8) reveals that εcc < ε for any χcc ∈ (0, 1), which re-
establishes the negative effect of extortion on the population of capital producers. Of
more interest to us is a comparison with (11), from which we observe that εcc ≶ εc
according to χcc ≷ pχc. This suggests the possibility that capital production may be
deterred by either more or less when corruption is present than when it is absent. A
sufficient condition for the former outcome is that the level of extortion is the same
in the two environments. As we shall see, however, this is not generally true and the
outcome is more ambiguous.
4.3 Organized criminals
In the presence of a corruptible police force, the mafia has the opportunity to pursue
its racketeering activities with the compliance of law enforcers. It does so by extorting
payments from capital producers using the threat of violence as a means of enforce-
ment, and by offering bribes to police officers in return for their agreement to overlook
such behavior. For each offence committed, the mafia’s income is xcct+1 −bt+1. As pre-
viously, the mafia makes its decisions optimally in a way that maximises its expected
payoff.
It is plausible (though not necessary) to imagine that the mafia’s prospects for
evading arrest and prosecution are better (or at least no worse) when corruption exists
than when it is absent. Accordingly, we now define q ′ ≥ q as the probability that the
mafia escapes with its ill-gotten gains.21 We continue to assume that, in the alternative
20 We distinguish dcct+1 from dct+1 for the same reason that we distinguish xcct+1 from xct+1.
21 One may conceive of this probability as depending on r , the probability that corrupt law enforcers also
evade prosecution. For example, the mafia may face the possibility of apprehension only if its conspirators
are apprehended, in which case the mafia’s probability of evading arrest might be q ′ = r + (1 − r)q > q,
where q may represent the probability that law enforcers do not squeal (maintain a conspiracy of silence).
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event of being apprehended, the mafia loses a fraction of its final income, which is
the income left over after paying bribes. This potential cost to the mafia is given by
γ (xcct+1 − bt+1). The other cost to the mafia is its outlay on enforcing extortion, which
is given similarly to before as 
dcct+1.
Given the above, we may deduce the mafia’s expected payoff, E(vt ), as follows.
Its net income from each capital producer is xcct+1 − bt+1 . All of this income is
pocketed with probability q ′, whilst only (1 − γ )(xct+1 − bt+1) of it is kept with
probability 1 − q ′. The mafia’s expected income per victim is therefore given by
q ′(xcct+1 − bt+1)+ (1 − q ′)(1 − γ )(xcct+1 − bt+1) = [1 − γ (1 − q ′)](xcct+1 − bt+1). The
number of potential victims is given by εcc in (17), all of whom can be preyed upon
with certainty at a cost of 
dcct+1. Collecting these observations together, we arrive at
the following expression for the mafia’s expected payoff:
E(vt ) = {[1 − γ (1 − q ′)]χccβεcc − 
δcc}Mlt . (18)
As before, the mafia chooses its optimal behavior in acknowledgement of the behav-
ior of others. In addition to entrepreneurs’ decisions as to whether or not to undertake
capital production and whether or not to surrender to extortion, there is the consid-
eration of luring police officers into corruption. Consequently, the mafia takes into
account (17) (the engagement of entrepreneurs in capital production), χcc ≤ δcc (the
compliance of capital producers in extortion) and 1 − β ≥ (1 − r)φ (the participation
of law enforcers in bribe-taking). The mafia’s decision problem is, therefore, given as
max .
χcc,δcc,β
E(vt ) = {[1 − γ (1 − q ′)]χccβεcc − 
δcc}Mlt ,
s.t. εcc = (1 − χcc)M,
χcc ≤ δcc,
(1 − r)φ ≤ 1 − β.
Solving this problem, as outlined in the Appendix, yields
χcc = δcc = 1
2
{
1 − 

β[1 − γ (1 − q ′)]M
}
, (19)
1 − β = (1 − r)φ, (20)
εcc = 1
2
{
M + 

β[1 − γ (1 − q ′)]
}
. (21)
These results can be interpreted similarly to those established earlier.
The result in (19) re-establishes that χcc = δcc, meaning that the mafia exacts
extortion payments from capital producers by threatening them with the minimum
damage needed for this. Similarly, the level of extortion is observed to be decreasing
in 
 (the mafia’s resource cost in demonstrating its threats) and decreasing in γ (1−q ′)
(the mafia’s expected punishment for its crimes). Additionally, we find that the amount
of extortion is increasing in β (the fraction of mafia income left over after paying
bribes). Accordingly, lower bribe payments provokes the mafia to extort more, the
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reason being simply that the mafia keeps more of its illegal income.22 The result
in (20) gives the optimal bribe payment, 1 − β, which the mafia sets at the lowest
possible level that encourages law enforcers to be corrupt (i.e., the level at which law
enforcers’ corruption participation constraint binds). An implication of this is that a
stronger deterrent to corruption (as measured by (1 − r)φ) forces the mafia to make
higher bribe payments which, in turn, induces a lower rate of extortion.23
The result in (21) demonstrates, as before, that the number of capital producers,
εcc, is increasing in both 
 and γ (1−q ′) because of the effects of these cost terms on
the level of extortion. Additionally, we observe that the number of capital producers
is decreasing in β, which is similarly explained by the impact of this bribe factor on
the level of extortion.
4.4 Growth
The growth rate of the economy is derived in the usual way. Equilibrium in the capital
market requires kt+1 = εcc Alt , whilst equilibrium in the loan market implies lt = wt ,
where wt is given in (2).24 Consequently, we have
kt+1
kt
= εcc Aα ≡ gcc. (22)
As before, the key determinant of growth is the number of capital-producing
entrepreneurs, which now depends on factors related to both crime and corruption. In
particular, gcc is reduced by any reduction in εcc caused by an increase in extortion and
bribe-taking, as indicated above. Given our earlier observation that εcc < ε, a com-
parison of (22) and (9) re-asserts that gcc < g: growth in a badly governed economy
is lower than growth in a well-governed economy.25
5 A comparison of environments
The basic message of our analysis so far is uncontroversial and confirms what one
generally presumes—namely, that an economy performs better when it is free from
all crime and corruption than when it is saddled with either or both these. Our primary
22 Essentially, bribe payments act as a proportional tax on the mafia’s illicit activities. A reduction in this
tax encourages the mafia to engage more in these activities.
23 The effect of anti-corruption strategies (or lack of) on criminal activity is an important issue, though it is
not one that we pursue in this paper. There are several analyses that do so, indicating the many nuances and
complexities of the issue (e.g., Bowles and Garoupa 1997; Chang et al. 2000; Jellal and Garpoupa 2007;
Polinsky and Shavell 2001).
24 As explained earlier, neither the mafia’s illegal income nor the salaries of law enforcers contribute to the
amount of loanable funds. The same is true of law enforcers’ bribe income, which is received in the second
period of life.
25 Like before, our earlier assertion, based on (8) and (17), that εcc < ε for any χcc ∈ (0, 1) requires us to
ensure that the latter is true. From (19), the parameter restriction needed for this is [1−γ (1−q ′)]Mβ > 
 >
−[1 − γ (1 − q ′)]Mβ. Obviously, the second inequality (χcc < 1) is automatically satisfied. The first
inequality (χcc > 0) delivers εcc < ε.
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interest is the question of whether an economy is damaged by more or less if crime
occurs alone than if crime co-exists with corruption. We study this as follows.
Whichever type of environment one considers, the ultimate factor in impeding
growth is the mafia’s extortion of capital producers. It is this which deters capital
production by increasing the costs to entrepreneurs of undertaking such activity. The
question of which type of environment suffers the most damage is therefore a question
of which type of environment suffers the most racketeering. To be sure, a comparison
of (15) and (22), together with (11) and (17), shows that whether gc ≷ gcc depends
solely on whether εc ≷ εcc which, in turn, depends solely on whether pχc ≶ χcc. The
last of these inequalities compares the expected extortion payment in the presence of
crime alone with the extortion payment in the presence of both crime and corruption.
By resolving this inequality, we resolve the other two.
From (13) and (19), we find that pχc ≶ χcc according to p[1−γ (1−q)] ≷ β[1−
γ (1−q ′)]. The key parameters in this condition are p (the fraction of potential victims
exposed to the mafia in a crime-only environment) and β (the fraction of post-bribe
income available to the mafia in a crime-plus-corruption environment). Essentially,
these parameters substitute for each other in determining the mafia’s potential returns
from extortion. As we have seen, a higher value of p implies a higher value of pχc
(even if χc falls), and a higher value of β implies a higher value of χcc. It follows that
pχc > χcc is more (less) likely the greater (lower) is p relative to β. From above,
this translates into a greater (lower) likelihood that εc < εcc and gc < gcc.26
The above analysis demonstrates how the effects of organized crime on economic
activity may depend on the participation in corruption by those responsible for prevent-
ing such crime. A priori, this dependence is ambiguous in the sense that the damage
inflicted by organized crime may be greater or less when corruption exists than when
it is absent. This is our key result which has not, to our knowledge, been established
before.
The ambiguous prediction of our analysis may appear somewhat surprising. One
might typically presume that the combination of organized crime and corruption is
more damaging to an economy than organized crime alone. We have articulated the
reasons why this may not be the case.
6 Conclusion
This paper has sought to cast further light on the macroeconomic implications of orga-
nized crime and its interaction with corruption. These two phenomena are amongst
the most vivid examples of poor quality governance and badly functioning institu-
tions. Their adverse effects on growth and development are well documented, and the
fight against each of them remains high on the agendas of national and international
agencies. What is less well understood is the extent to which their impacts might be
reinforced or subdued through linkages between them. Making in-roads to this has
been our primary objective in this paper.
26 Comparing the final outcomes for εc and εcc in (14) and (21), one observes that εc ≷ εcc according to
p[1 − γ (1 − q)] ≶ β[1 − γ (1 − q ′)]—exactly the reverse condition for pχc ≷ χc , as suggested earlier.
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Our analysis shows how organized crime alone creates an unfavorable climate for
business activity by raising the costs of this activity through extortion. The upshot is
that growth is lower than would otherwise be the case. This is what one would expect,
but our modelling strategy is designed to go much further in demonstrating how the
impact of organized crime may be conditional on the presence of corruption. As our
results indicate, this conditionality could go either way—organized crime may be more
or less damaging if it co-exists with corruption. The intuition is that since corruption
operates as a tax on criminality, the outcome depends on the expected payoffs of the
crime syndicate when having to pay bribes to corrupt law officers. This, in turn, depends
on the trade-off between a lower supply of crimes and the probability these crimes are
more likely to be successful. If corruption, despite its direct cost to criminals, leads to
higher (lower) expected payoff from extortion, then the growth-diminishing effect of
crime is greater (smaller) in the presence of corruption. Ultimately, however, whether
organized crime distorts economic growth by a different degree when acting alone
compared to when co-existing with corruption, is an empirical question. This is a task
undertaken in a companion paper, by Neanidis et al. (2017), with a focus on Italian
regions, admittedly a geographical area historically saddled with both types of illicit
activities.
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Appendix A: Solution to the Mafia’s problem in the absence of corruption
The results in (13) and (14) are obtained by setting up the Lagrangian,
L = {[1 − γ (1 − q)]pχc(1 − pχc)M − 
δc}Mlt + λt (δc − χc),
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier. The optimality and complementary slackness
conditions are
[1 − γ (1 − q)]p(1 − 2pχc)M2lt − λt = 0, (A1)
−
Mlt + λt = 0, (A2)
λt (δ
c − χc), λt ≥ 0, δc ≥ χc. (A3)
From (A2), we have λt = 
Mlt > 0, which implies that δc = χc from (A3).
Substitution into (A1) gives the result in (13), which may be substituted into (11) to
arrive at the result in (14).
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Appendix B: Solution to the Mafia’s problem in the presence of corruption
The results in (19)–(21) are obtained by setting up the Lagrangian,
L = {[1 − γ (1 − q ′)]χccβ(1 − χcc)M − 
δcc}Mlt
+λ1t (δcc − χcc) + λ2t [1 − β − (1 − r)φ],
λi t (i = 1, 2) is the Lagrange multiplier. The optimality and complementary slackness
conditions are
[1 − γ (1 − q ′)]β(1 − 2χcc)M2lt − λ1t = 0, (B1)
−
Mlt + λ1t = 0, (B2)
[1 − γ (1 − q ′)]χcc(1 − χcc)M2lt − λ2t = 0, (B3)
λ1t (δ
cc − χcc), λ1t ≥ 0, δcc ≥ χcc, (B4)
λ2t [1 − β − (1 − r)φ] ≥ 0, λ2t ≥ 0, 1 − β ≥ (1 − r)φ. (B5)
From (B2), we have λ1t = 
Mlt > 0, which implies that δcc = χcc from (B4).
Substitution into (B1) gives the result in (19), which may be substituted into (17) to
arrive at the result in (21). From (B3) we have λ2t = [1−γ (1−q ′)]χcc(1−χcc)M2lt >
0, which implies that 1 − β = (1 − r)φ from (B5). This is the result in (20).
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